Recent empirical work using panel data documents that, while the correlation of investment and Tobin's Q is low, the correlation of investment and credit spreads is high. We propose an explanation for these empirical findings, based on time-varying risk, i.e. stochastic volatility. In our model, firms finance investments using defaultable debt as well as equity issuance, and they are subject to standard profitability shocks as well as shocks to volatility. An increase in volatility leads to an increase in the probability of default and hence the credit spread, while reducing investment and increasing equity value. This shock hence generates a negative correlation between investment and credit spreads, and between investment and Q, helping the model match the data.
The unconditional correlation, in our model, is a weighted average of the correlation conditional on profitability shocks, and the correlation conditional on volatility shocks. Both shocks lead to a positive correlation of bond prices and investment, hence the model predicts that this correlation is high. But only the profitability shock generates a positive correlation between stock prices and investment, hence the correlation of stock prices and investment is low. Hence, our model can replicate the patterns of correlations in the data.
An interesting empirical implication of the model regards the correlation between a firm's bond return and its stock return. In the standard model (i.e. with constant volatility), bond returns and stock returns are highly correlated. In our model, volatility shocks induce a negative correlation. We plan to use this as a test of our model. Preliminary results suggests that this correlation is indeed negative for firms close to default.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the introduction reviews the related literature. Section 2 studies a simple two period example which helps clarify the intuition. Section 3 presents our quantitative model. Section 4 calibrates it and studies its implications numerically. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Our paper is directly related to the vast literature on the Q-theory of investment and the cash flow sensitivity (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) , Gomes (2001) ). This literature documents the empirical significance of cash flows and its interpretation. One conclusion from this literature is that, while there are many potential mechanisms that break the theoretical link between Q and investment, such as fixed costs, financing constraints, or decreasing return to scales, there are very few quantitative models which replicate the failure of the investment regressions, and most researchers appeal to measurement error in Q (e.g., Erickson and Whited (2001) , Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2008) ).
Second, there is a small literature on the relation between investment and uncertainty. This literature emphasizes that models with real options or equivalently fixed cost or irreversibility imply a negative effect of uncertainty on investment (see e.g. Bernanke (1983) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Caballero (1991), Pindyck (1993) , Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007) ). In our model, the effect of uncertainty occurs through a different mechanism: debt becomes a less efficient means of finance when uncertainty increases. Empirical evidence suggests a significant effect of uncertainty on investment (Leahy and Whited (1996) , Guioso and Parigi (1999)) but the channel through which the effect operates is not established.
Recently several studies have considered the possibility that idiosyncratic risk varies over time (Bloom (2009) , Bachmann and Bayer (2009) ), however our point of departure is somewhat different since we consider idiosyncratic increases in firm volatility, i.e. volatility shocks are not correlated across firms.
The corporate finance literature has emphasized the endogeneity of volatility, known as the riskshifting problem (equity holders may choose to increase volatility). Our model has exogenous increases in the volatility of the technology shocks, but firms respond to these changes by altering capital, hence the total volatility of profits is endogenous. But because debt is one-period, the volatility is known by debtholders when they decide to buy the firm's bonds. Hence there is no risk-shifting problem in this setup.
Two-Period Partial Equilibrium Example
This section provides a simple model to illustrate the effect of an increase in risk on investment, equity value, Tobin Q and bond yields. There are two time periods. At time 1, the firm buys capital k, which is financed using equity issuance s and debt: the firm issues a debt with face value b, with market price
The parameter χ > 1 reflects the tax shield effect (i.e. interest expenses are deductible from corporate income). To simplify we assume in this section that the deduction is done at issuance: for each dollar of debt issued, the firm receives a subsidy (χ − 1)$.
At time 2, the firm produces, and generates a profit π = zk α , where z is an idiosyncratic shock, which is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function H. We denote by h the corresponding probability distribution function.
The firm will default if its profits are not large enough to repay its debt, i.e. if z < z * , where the threshold z * is defined through the condition,
If the firm does default, the absolute priority rule applies: equity holders receive nothing, while bondholders share the firm profits, net of proportional bankruptcy costs. We denote by θ the recovery rate,
i.e. 1 − θ is bankruptcy costs.
The market price of debt is the expected discounted payoff to debtholders. Assuming that investors are risk-neutral and have a discount factor β, we have,
In this formula, the first term is the repayment of the face value in the non-default states, and the second term is the recovery of profits, divided across all the bondholders in the event of default.
The firm equity value is the expected discounted payoff to equity holders, i.e. the expected profits net of debt repayment, in non-default states:
We can rewrite this by substituting out b:
The first term in this expression is the expected discounted operating profit, i.e. βk α E(z). The second term reflects the expected tax shield benefits in non-default states, since z
The third term reflects the expected bankruptcy costs, net of tax shield benefits, in default states. The last term is the cost of investment.
It is easy to check that if there are no bankruptcy costs, θ = 1, then it is optimal to finance with debt only. Inversely, if there is no tax shield, χ = 1, then an all-equity financing is optimal. We assume that χθ < 1, i.e. bankruptcy costs are larger than the tax shield effect conditional on default. This assumption is necessary to generate the standard trade-off.
The program (5) can be solved by writing the two first order conditions, with respect to k and z * , which determine the optimal investment and financing (intuitively, we can think of z * as leverage, since it is the ratio of debt to expected output, z * = b/k α ). First, we have,
In the case with χ = θ = 1, we obtain the usual user cost rule: the expected marginal product of capital is equal to the cost of capital, 1 = βαk α−1 E(z). When θ < 1 or χ > 1, the user cost needs to be adjusted to reflect expected bankruptcy costs (which increase the user cost) and the tax shield (which decreases it).
The second first-order condition, with respect to z * , yields, after rearrangement,
This equation determines the optimal probability of default H(z * ), and the leverage z
The left side is the marginal benefit of leverage, which is the higher tax shield in non-default states, while the right side is the marginal cost of leverage, i.e. the increase in expected bankruptcy costs, which depends on the probability of having z close to z * . Under some regularity conditions on the distribution h, equation (7) determines a unique default cutoff z * , given the parameters χ and θ and the distribution h. 4 Equation (6) then determines the investment choice k.
We define Q as the total market value of the firm, divided by its capital stock:
Note that we include the subsidy received, i.e. we count the total debt finance raised by the firm in period 1.
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To understand the model, Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choice of debt. More precisely, we present As illustrated in the first panel, as the firm increases its debt issuance, it simultaneously reduces the equity issuance, since the investment is fixed at k * in this experiment. The second panel illustrates a "Laffer curve": as the face value of debt increases, the amount actually raised first increases nearly one-for-one, then less than one-for-one, and finally falls as default becomes more likely. Default implies bankruptcy costs which will reduce the value available to creditors, hence at some point a decrease in the total amount raised. Obviously the firm never decides to increase debt beyond the maximum of this curve. Indeed, the third and fourth panel document that the probability of default, and hence the credit spread, has a "hockey stick" pattern as debt is increased, and the firm limits its debt issuance to remain safely left of the sharp increase. The last panel shows that the firm actually picks the debt level to maximize Q: ex-ante, the firm's managers decide on financial policy to maximize the total firm value (i.e. we can think of the manager as deciding on debt and equity issues so as to maximize the value he can raise by selling the firm in both debt and equity markets).
We can now use this "toy model" to perform comparative statics. As is well known, an increase in the recovery rate θ reduces the expected bankruptcy costs, and hence, according to equation (7), lead to higher leverage z * , and, according to equation (6), to a higher capital stock. The probability of default H(z * ) also rises, leading to a rise in the spread. The equity value falls as firms substitute debt for equity. Similarly, an increase in the tax shield parameter χ reduces the user cost of capital and hence leads, according to equation (6) , to a higher capital stock, higher debt, as well, a higher leverage z * , and hence a higher probability of default, higher spreads and higher equity value. Last, an increase in the mean of z leads to a higher capital, equity value, and debt, but does not affect z * or the probability of default. Table 1 We now turn to the main experiment of this section, the effect of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution H. Because the analysis depends on the exact shape of the distribution function, no analytical result is available, but we consider some numerical examples. Specifically, we assume that z is log-normally distributed, with mean − 1 2 σ 2 and variance σ 2 . As a result, an increase in σ is a mean-preserving spread of H. 6 For any σ, we have E(z) = 1 and we can obtain simple formula for the integrals appearing in these formulas. In Figure 2 shows the responses of the endogenous variables as we increase σ. The specific parameter values used for this example are: β = .95, α = .9, θ = .5, χ = 1.03, but the results appear extremely robust to changes in these parameter values. Intuitively, the increase in volatility increases the probability of default, and hence the expected bankruptcy costs, making debt less attractive. This leads the firm to reduce its leverage, which lowers the probability of default, but does not completely offset the effect of a higher σ. The higher probability of default naturally pushes up the yield on the debt. Last, the higher bankruptcy costs increase the user cost, which generates a reduction in the capital stock. This numerical example suggests that shocks to volatility can generate the pattern of correlations needed to match the empirical evidence outlined in the introduction. Comparative Statics. The figure shows the effects of volatility σ on the optimal firm policies k and b, the yield spread, the probability of default, the equity value V , and Tobin's Q in the baseline model.
There is however one dimension in which the model is failing: as shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 2 , Tobin's Q is unaffected by the volatility σ. Indeed, it is easy to show that Q = 1 α . Intuitively, as σ rises, the firm value falls, and k falls, but these two quantities fall proportionately, and hence their particular, we use the result that if log z is N (µ, σ), then the cumulative distribution function of z is H(z) = Φ log z−µ σ , where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Moreover the probability distribution function is,
where φ is the standard normal PDF. Last, we have for all x,
ratio Q is unchanged. Formally, the user cost equation (6) can be written as,
where N = E(z)+ expected tax shield − expected bankruptcy costs. Tobin's Q is actually,
and hence Q = 1 α , the expected average profit rate. This feature of the model, however, is highly specific to this example: the marginal value of capital is proportional to the average value, which is why Q is invariant to all parameters except α. We now consider a simple extension of the example with a growth option, which breaks the proportionality of the average and marginal value of capital.
Extension with Growth Option
We extend the model in a minimal way, by assuming that the value of operations at time 2 is not
, where G is a growth option, i.e. G(z) is the expected present discounted value of future profits if z is realized. 7 We assume that G (z) > 0. In our quantitative model (see Section 3), the growth option will be endogenously determined by the future profits of the firm.
With this modification, the firm will now default if z < z * where
and the bond price is,
where we assume that the growth option can also be recovered at rate θ. 8 The firm equity value is,
The firm picks k, b, s, z * to maximize its present discounted value, V − s, which leads to two first-order conditions. First,
which is the same as equation (6), since the marginal value of capital is unchanged -the only effect of the growth option is to change the default region. Second, we have,
Note that this equation simplifies to the condition (7) if we assume G(z) = 0.
7 To make G endogenous, we may write a three-period model, e.g. at time 2 the firm can buy capital to take advantage of the realized z. 8 Alternative assumptions are possible and do not affect the main result significantly. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of an increase in σ on the firm value in this extended model.the example above, k and b fall, as expected bankruptcy costs rise, and the probability of default, the spread and the equity value all increase. The key difference is that this model now also generates an increase in Tobin Q in response to the increase in σ.
To understand this, we can compute Q, which after some algebra is,
i.e. Q equals the expected profit rate 1 α , plus the ratio of the expected value of the growth option and its tax shield, net of bankruptcy costs, to the capital stock. An increase in σ, to a first order, does not affect this expected value, but it does reduce the capital stock and hence increases Q. Because the average and marginal value of capital are not proportional any more, the model can generate the intuitive result for all four key variables (capital, yields, equity value and Tobin Q). Unlike in the static model, firms can borrow in the form of a multi-period defaultable debt. Bankruptcy costs are incurred upon default and the interest expense on debt can be deducted from taxable income.
The model builds on the recent corporate finance literature 10 , and more specifically is an extension of the recent study of Gomes and Schmid (2009). The main difference is that we explicitly introduce stochastic volatility shocks in order to quantify the effect of stochastic volatility on investment, credit spreads, and Tobin's Q.
Firm Problem
The dynamic programming problem for a firm is to choose capital k , debt b , and a default policy to maximize the present value of dividends. The idiosyncratic productivity shock z and volatility shock σ are exogenous shocks. Firms use physical capital as input to their production function. Operating profits are denoted by π(k, z) and are strictly increasing and strictly concave in capital, that is π k > 0 and π kk < 0. Capital depreciates at rate δ k , thus investment in capital follows the equation,
In addition we assume that firms incur a cost φ(i, k) to install i units of capital from the outstanding level k. The loan has a face value q, thus firms raise the amount ql. Firms promise to repay a fixed proportion of the balance on the loan every period. Specifically, a $1 loan at time t will yield a payment δ b at time
2 at time t + 3, and so on. In other words a $1 loan issued at time t will require an infinite stream of annuity payments, where the annuity at time
Denote the sum of all outstanding loans by b.
Profits are taxed at a rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and interest expense can be deducted from taxable income.
We assume that the firm can shield the net present value of the interest expenses on the loan at the date of issuance. Therefore the firm will raiseql instead of ql, whereq will include the tax subsidy.
The dividend for the firm is defined as the sum of after-tax profits and new loan, net of debt service, investment and investment cost,
where the new loan issued is,
For simplicity we assume that the outstanding debt is non-callable, that is we require the new loan to be positive (i.e. l ≥ 0).
Financing frictions are present in the form of costly equity issuances. Following Gomes (2001) , equity
can be issued at a proportional cost λ, that is dividend net of equity issuance is given by,
where 1 {d<0} is the indicator function of strictly negative dividends, i.e. 1 {d<0} = 1 ifd < 0 (and 0 otherwise).
Firms maximize the present discounted value of dividends. As mentioned before, firms have the option to default on their debt obligation when the equity value reaches zero. The indicator function that states that the firm continues operations at time t is denoted by 1 {Vt≥0} . The value of the firm, denoted by V , at time 0 can be expressed as the infinite horizon sum of dividends,
where initial capital k 0 , initial debt b 0 , and initial state s 0 are given. Firms take the subjective discount rate β ∈ [0, 1] as given. The vector s contains all the exogenous state variables in the economy. Specifically, the idiosyncratic productivity shock z and volatility shock σ are included in the exogenous state vector. The firm problem can be written in the recursive form as follows,
Lenders
Debt is priced by competitive risk-neutral lenders. Any new loan issued l has to be fairly priced. The discount price today has to be equal to the expected value of the discounted stream of repayments. At time t the price of the new loan l t is denoted by q t , and is defined as follows,
In the event of default, debtholders can appropriate current profits and the capital stock but only recover a fraction ξ of the proceeds. It is interesting to note that the lenders of a new loan have a claim on the default payoff that is decreasing over time, given that this loan is being repaid at rate δ b over time. Hence the lenders of new loan l t have a claim equal to (1 − δ b ) s−1 l t /b t+s of the total default payoff at time t + s.
Because repayments of loans occurs over multiple periods in the future, lenders have to know the future investment and debt choices of firms. Therefore the recursive formulation of the debt price will depend on the firm's optimal capital and debt polices, denoted by g k (k, b, s) and g b (k, b, s) , respectively.
The recursive formulation for the loan price schedule q(k , b , s) is,
Credit Spreads and Duration
Because debt is repaid over time, the credit spreads are defined as the yield to maturity of the new loan minus the risk free rate. The yield to maturity is defined as the rate c that equates the price of the loan issue to the discounted payoff, that is c satisfies the following equation,
Using this relationship the yield to maturity is a function of the price of the loan,
Credit spreads CS are defined as the yield to maturity of a new loan minus the risk free rate, that is,
We have assumed that the firm can shield the net present value of the interest expenses on the loan at the date of issuance. Thus the price of the new loan inclusive of tax subsidyq is given by,
.
Note that if we know the lenders price schedule q(k , b , s), the price inclusive of tax subsidy is a straightforward function of the price and tax rate, i.e.q =q(q, τ ).
The duration of the loan is denoted by D and defined as,
The concept of duration in this model is very helpful as it allows us to map an exponentially decaying debt with duration D(δ b ) to the maturity of a pure discount bond of D periods.
Recursive Formulation of the Firm Problem
The firm problem is stated formally in the following.
Problem 1 (Recursive Formulation of the Firm Problem) Given the loan price scheduleq(k , b , s),
firms solve the following program,
Numerical Results
This section describes our approach to solve the model in Section 3. There are no closed-form expressions for this equilibrium, therefore numerical techniques are employed to solve it. We explain the choice of the key parameters of the model and describe the numerical approach.
Parameter Choice
The model is calibrated at the quarterly frequency. Table 2 reports the parameters we use for the numerical analysis. The preference parameter β (i.e. the subjective discount rate) is set to generate a 2% yearly risk free rate.
The productivity process z is parameterized along the lines of Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2005). The productivity process z is restricted to follow a first order autoregressive process with normal innovations. Specifically,
where t+1 are independently and identically distributed shocks drawn from a standard normal distribution. In order to match the persistence of firms' output, the productivity process has to be persistent, that is we set ρ z = 0.95. These numbers are somewhat standard in the literature for this type of exercise. The productivity process is represented by a discrete Markov chain using 25 points. The stochastic volatility process is assumed to be a Markov chain with 2 states σ ∈ {σ L , σ H } and transition matrix Γ σσ .
Firm profits exhibit decreasing returns in physical capital and the firm must pay a fixed cost of operation f each period. Profits are assumed to take the following functional form,
where α ∈ (0, 1) characterizes the degree of decreasing returns to scale for capital. In line with the literature, we choose to set α = 0.4.
Following the Q theory literature, 11 the capital adjustment cost function φ(i, k) is assumed to be quadratic in investment rates, given by,
where θ 1 and θ 2 are parameters which capture the asymmetry between the cost of investing and disinvesting. This formulation has been previously considered by Zhang (2005) .
Cost of equity issuances are chosen to be 25%. This figure is in line with findings in the literature, for example Hennessy and Whited (2008) estimated these issuance costs to be about 6% using the simulated method of moments. The average tax rate is chosen to be 20%. Bankruptcy costs are assumed to correspond to a dead-weight cost of 50% of current capital stock, thus the recovery rate is set to ξ = 0.5. The set of parameters used to solve the model is summarized in Table 2 . In order to understand the effect of the stochastic volatility in this environment, we will contrast the results between a model with deterministic volatility and a model with stochastic volatility. The level of volatility used in the deterministic is equal to the long-run average volatility of the stochastic volatility Markov chain. Given the parameters of our computations, the model with deterministic volatility has volatility set to σ = 0.05.
Basic Properties
The Our model economy is solved and simulated for a panel of 500 firms over 500 periods. Summary statistics of the firms' optimal policies along with the data counterpart are given in 
Predictability Properties
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of the model to replicate some standard corporate finance regressions. We are interested in understanding how stochastic volatility impacts the comovements between investment rate and corporate bond yields.
The results for the regressions of investment on Q and spreads were provided to us by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek. These authors assembled firm-level data on investment, Tobin Q and credit spreads by Table 4 . Regression results for the model economy along with the data counterpart are given in Table 5 . The first result is that credit spreads explain about 12% of the variation in investment rates in the simulated data for the deterministic model, and about 10% for the model with stochastic volatility. Both models produce too much explanatory power compared to the 5% figure in the data.
The second result is that the addition of Q in the regressions improves the fit substantially in the deterministic model, from an R-squared of about 12% to 17%. In contrast, Q does not improve the explanatory power much beyond credit spreads in the data, from an R-squared of 5.4% to 6.2%. This feature is also present in the model with stochastic volatility where the addition of Q does not improve the R-squared by much (from 10% to 11%).
The model with stochastic volatility performs better than the model with deterministic volatility as it replicates the feature in the data that Q does not explain all of the cross-sectional variation in investment. However the present calibration exhibit some excess correlation between investment and Tobin's Q. Out-of-sample data moments such as asset prices will be needed in order to discipline the amount and the form of stochastic volatility introduced in the economy.
Conclusion
We introduced stochastic volatility in a standard model of corporate finance and investment. We showed that, consistent with intuition, this additional shock can generate higher correlations between credit spreads and investment, and weaker correlations between Q and investment, as in the data. However, the correlation between spreads and investment is still too small, and the correlation between Q and investment is still too high, compared to the data.
In future work, we plan to introduce some extensions which might magnify the effect of stochastic volatility. We may introduce risk-aversion through an exogenous stochastic discount factor, as well as consider different specifications for adjustment costs. We also plan to study empirically the correlation of firm-level stock returns and bond returns, to measure directly the amount of stochastic volatility in the data.
A possible extension of the project is to consider the macroeconomic implications of the model, when the shock to volatility is correlated across firms. A lower volatility, such as the "Great Moderation", would lead firms to take on more debt, and increase leverage and investment. In the process, they might become more sensitive to productivity (or other) shocks.
